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THE CONTRACTUALLY BASED ECONOMIC LOSS
RULE IN TORT LAW: ENDANGERED




The rule of strict products liability has been widely adopted in the
United States, subjecting manufacturers and other product distribu-
tors to strict tort liability for physical harms proximately caused by
defective products.1  The scope of strict products liability has also
been widely limited to exclude tort recovery for cases in which the
defect did not cause physical harm but only damaged the product it-
self, causing pure economic loss, such as repair costs and lost profits.
These two rules pose a question that frames a confusing body of case
law: Why does strict products liability permit tort recovery for physi-
cal harms and deny recovery for pure economic loss?
In cases of pure economic loss, a growing majority of courts have
followed the approach charted by the U.S. Supreme Court in East
River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delavel Inc., which barred tort
recovery for all stand-alone economic harms to ensure that contract
law does not “drown in a sea of tort.”2  As the Court explained, “dam-
age to a product itself has certain attributes of a products-liability
claim.  But the injury suffered—the failure of the product to function
properly—is the essence of a warranty action, through which a con-
tracting party can seek to recoup the benefit of its bargain.”3  This
contracting rationale has been regularly invoked by other courts,
yielding a “high degree of agreement” that the resultant “economic
* Sheila Lubetsky Birnbaum Professor of Civil Litigation, New York University School of
Law.  Copyright 2015 Mark A. Geistfeld.  All rights reserved.  This Article more rigorously de-
velops an argument I previously made in MARK A. GEISTFELD, PRINCIPLES OF PRODUCTS LIA-
BILITY 256–64 (2d ed. 2011).  Both projects were supported by the Filomen D’Agostino and Max
E. Greenberg Research Fund of the New York University School of Law.
1. See MARK A. GEISTFELD, PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW 1–67 (2012) (describing the develop-
ment of strict products liability in the United States).
2. 476 U.S. 858, 866 (U.S. 1986).
3. Id. at 867–68.
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loss rule” bars tort recovery for pure economic loss to maintain the
boundary between contract and tort law.4
Pursuant to East River Steamship, courts only look at the form of
the alleged injury (Is it for pure economic loss?) to determine whether
the damages claim in a product case is governed by contract or tort
law.  The form of the alleged injury, however, does not adequately
define the economic loss rule.  By adopting this definition, East River
Steamship has created problems.
Tort law recognizes a cause of action for pure economic loss in a
wide variety of cases, including “negligent misrepresentation, defama-
tion, professional malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, nuisance, loss
of consortium, wrongful death, spoliation of evidence, and unreasona-
ble failure to settle a claim within insurance policy limits.”5  Many of
these cases involve contractual relationships, yet plaintiffs recover tort
damages for their pure economic losses.  Why does contracting bar
tort recovery for pure economic loss in product cases but not others
involving contractual relationships?  As one judge observed: “The in-
consistent treatment of the doctrine by use of varying analytical
frameworks, does not provide the bench and bar guidance in the
proper application of the doctrine.”6  In the wake of East River Steam-
ship, courts have “underscore[d] the desirability—perhaps urgency—
of harmonizing the entire complex and confusing pattern of liability
and nonliability for tortious conduct in contractual settings.”7
The difficulty stems from the East River Steamship formulation of
the economic loss rule, which relies on a contracting rationale that is
not defined in substantive terms.  Neither the form of the alleged in-
jury nor the form of the parties’ relationship—the mere fact that they
could have contracted over liability for pure economic loss—necessa-
rily bars tort recovery across the full set of cases, so why does the
4. Vincent R. Johnson, The Boundary-Line Function of the Economic Loss Rule, 66 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 523, 526 (2009).  In contrast to the contractually based economic loss rule, “[a]
minority of courts have stated an ‘economic loss rule’ to the effect that there is generally no
liability in tort for causing pure economic loss to another.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM § 1 cmt. b (Am. Law Inst., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2012).  Most
courts, however, limit the economic loss rule to contractual relationships, reasoning that the
purpose of the doctrine is to police the tort-contract boundary. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Pulte Home
Corp., 306 P.3d 1, 2–3 (Ariz. 2013); Tiara Condo. Ass’n v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 110 So. 3d
399, 402–03 (Fla. 2013); Kreisers Inc. v. First Dakota Title Ltd. P’ship, 852 N.W.2d 413, 421 (S.D.
2014).  For this and other reasons that will become evident, the contractually based economic
loss rule in product and service cases fundamentally differs from the economic loss rule in ordi-
nary tort cases.
5. Johnson, supra note 4, at 530–32 (footnotes omitted). R
6. Sapp v. Ford Motor Co., 687 S.E.2d 47, 52 (S.C. 2009) (Beatty, J., concurring).
7. Rardin v. T & D Mach. Handling, Inc., 890 F.2d 24, 30 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.).
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contracting relationship bar tort recovery for pure economic loss in
product cases?  The answer requires a substantive rationale for the
economic loss rule that does not simply depend on the formal proper-
ties of the parties’ relationship and the alleged injury.  Unless the eco-
nomic loss rule is anchored by a substantive principle, judges will face
difficulty in “chart[ing] a course in what commentators and courts
across the country have referred to as the ‘choppy waters’ of the eco-
nomic loss rule.”8
Despite its importance, the contracting rationale for the economic
loss rule has not been rigorously analyzed or systematically devel-
oped.9  Doing so yields a well-defined decision rule for determining
whether tort damages are available for pure economic losses in prod-
uct and service cases.
Contrary to the reasoning in East River Steamship, a substantive
contracting rationale for the economic loss rule does not justify bar-
ring tort recovery for all types of pure economic loss proximately
caused by defective products.  The formal category of pure economic
loss encompasses substantively different types.  Form often follows
substance, in which case the East River Steamship rule yields the cor-
rect result.  Form, however, does not always follow substance, in
which case the East River Steamship rule bars tort recovery in a man-
ner that cannot be substantively justified by the contracting rationale.
Frequently, a product defect that causes pure economic loss only
implicates the consumer’s economic expectations—the core concern
of contract law.  These defects frustrate consumer expectations by
causing repair costs and lost profits, which were the types of loss at
8. Giddings & Lewis, Inc. v. Indus. Risk Insurers, 348 S.W.3d 729, 733 (Ky. 2011).
9. To be sure, scholars have discussed the role of contracting in policing the boundary line
between contract and tort law.  The most extensive analysis is provided by Johnson, supra note 4, R
at 553–83.  His analysis, however, does not rigorously evaluate the contracting problem; it as-
sumes, for example, that the absence of either privity or an actual contractual provision ordina-
rily forecloses a contracting rationale for limiting the tort duty with the economic loss rule. See
id. at 539 (arguing that “the rule generally should not be an obstacle to recovery if the plaintiff
was not a party to a contract with the defendant that is alleged to be the exclusive source of [the]
duty,” and that “hypothetical remedies under contracts that were never entered into should not
bar recovery under [general] tort principles”); see also Anita Bernstein, Keep It Simple: An Ex-
planation of the Rule of No Recovery for Pure Economic Loss, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 773, 775 (2006)
(rejecting the contracting rationale simply because “[s]ome economic-loss plaintiffs never could
have achieved private ordering with the defendant yet lose anyway”).  As shown in Part III, a
rigorously specified contracting rationale can justifiably bar tort recovery under conditions lack-
ing either privity or actual contract terms covering the economic loss in question.  This specifica-
tion also shows that the tort duty is not limited simply because the parties are in a web of
contractual relationships. Cf. Jay M. Feinman, The Economic Loss Rule and Private Ordering,
48 ARIZ. L. REV. 813, 823–26 (2006) (criticizing justifications for the economic loss rule based on
contracting and private ordering that make “market-focused subjects (contract and property) . . .
primary” over the ordering mandated by tort law).
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issue in East River Steamship.  In considering the allocation of liability
for these economic losses, the ordinary consumer is sufficiently well
informed to protect her interests by contracting.  For cases involving
these disappointed product users, the Court in East River Steamship
defensibly concluded that the denial of a tort claim ensures that con-
tract law does not “drown in a sea of tort.”10
In other cases, though, a product defect causes a type of pure eco-
nomic loss that implicates the consumer’s interest in physical secur-
ity—the core concern of tort law.  The defect, for example, can cause
the consumer to incur medical bills for monitoring a health condition
(like cancer) threatened by the defect.  As established by the widely
adopted rule of strict products liability, contracting does not ade-
quately protect poorly informed consumers from the threat of physical
harm, creating a safety problem that provides the substantive policy
rationale for a tort duty that overrides contractual limitations of a
seller’s responsibility for product defects.  This same contracting prob-
lem plagues cases of pure economic loss that involve the financial ex-
penditures required to protect endangered consumers from physical
harms threatened by product defects.  The inability of the ordinary
consumer to make informed contractual decisions concerning liability
for physical harms—the substantive rationale for strict products liabil-
ity—justifies tort recovery for these types of pure economic loss.
When the economic loss rule is justified by a substantive contracting
rationale, the availability of tort recovery for pure economic losses
depends on whether the ordinary consumer has the requisite informa-
tion to protect the relevant set of interests by contracting.  The sub-
stantive contracting rationale justifies an intermediate economic loss
rule that denies tort recovery for disappointed product users and per-
mits endangered consumers to recover tort damages for certain types
of pure economic loss.
The argument proceeds in three parts.  The East River Steamship
contracting rationale for the economic loss rule is described more fully
in Part II.  For reasons provided in Part III, this contracting rationale
can be squared with the substantive rationale for strict products liabil-
ity for contracting problems that only implicate the consumer’s eco-
nomic interests—the type of contracting problem involved in East
River Steamship.  But as Part III also shows, the contracting rationale
does not justifiably bar tort recovery for a different type of contracting
problem involving precautionary investments for reducing the unrea-
sonable risk of physical harm posed by a product defect, a loss that
10. E. River S.S., 476 U.S. at 866.
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implicates the consumer’s interest in physical security. The same gen-
eral conclusions apply to service contracts.  Based on this analysis,
Part IV proposes a substantive reformulation of the economic loss
rule that distinguishes between disappointed users and endangered
consumers, uniformly barring only the former from tort recovery.11
Part IV then shows that a strong majority of courts already recognize
the properly formulated rule in cases involving pure economic losses
of medical monitoring or the abatement of asbestos hazards.  This
contractually based intermediate economic loss rule explains the full
body of case law while being substantively consistent with the widely
adopted rule of strict products liability, unlike the East River Steam-
ship formulation, which only looks at the form of the alleged injury to
determine whether the claim is governed by contract law or tort law.
II. THE EAST RIVER STEAMSHIP CONTRACTING RATIONALE FOR
THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE
Within tort law, pure economic loss is conventionally defined as any
“pecuniary or commercial loss that does not arise from actionable
physical, emotional or reputational injury to persons or physical injury
to property.”12  In product cases, a pure economic loss occurs when a
defect only damages the product without otherwise causing compen-
sable physical harm (bodily injury or damage to real or tangible prop-
erty other than the product).  Instead, the defect degrades product
performance in a manner that causes foreseeable financial harms, like
repair costs and lost profits.  Whether plaintiffs can receive tort dam-
ages for these harms depends on whether damage to the product itself
(the defect) can serve as a predicate harm that triggers tort liability for
consequential economic losses.
To resolve this issue, courts regularly rely on East River Steamship,
an admiralty case in which the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that
federal maritime law incorporates the common law of strict products
liability.13  In East River Steamship, ships manufactured by the defen-
dant had defective turbines that malfunctioned, causing the ships to
operate at reduced capacity.14  Plaintiffs sought tort damages for their
repair costs and lost profits while the ships were out of service.15  Be-
11. Some courts have adopted a similar intermediate rule, permitting endangered consumers
to recover tort damages for pure economic losses, but they have not properly formulated the
rule. See infra Part III.E.
12. Dan B. Dobbs, An Introduction to Non-Statutory Economic Loss Claims, 48 ARIZ. L.
REV. 713, 713 (2006).
13. E. River S.S., 476 U.S. at 865.
14. Id. at 859–60.
15. Id. at 861.
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cause each defect only injured the product itself (the ship) and did not
cause any bodily injury or damage to other real or tangible property,
plaintiffs’ tort claims were for pure economic loss.  To determine
whether plaintiffs could recover in tort, the Court considered how
state courts applied their rules of strict products liability in cases of
pure economic loss.16  The Court identified three different approaches
that had been taken by the state courts, ultimately “adopt[ing] a [rule]
similar” to the one earlier formulated by the California Supreme
Court in Seely v. White Motor Company,17 “the case that created the
majority land-based approach.”18  Both the rule and justificatory rea-
soning in Seely were largely adopted by East River Steamship, making
it necessary to evaluate East River Steamship in relation to the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court’s approach in Seely.
In Seely, the plaintiff purchased a truck manufactured by the defen-
dant that bounced violently when driven, “an action known as ‘gallop-
ing.’”19  The truck crashed once without causing injury to anything
other than the truck itself, but the ongoing galloping problem finally
induced the plaintiff to return the truck to the dealer and seek recov-
ery for the repair costs that he incurred because of the crash, the
purchase price, and “the profits [he] lost in his business because he
was unable to make normal use of the truck.”20  The trial court
awarded damages on the ground that the defendant breached an ex-
press warranty, but it denied tort recovery for repair costs because the
accident in question was not caused by the defect.  On appeal, the
parties disagreed about the extent to which the contractual warranty
claim was affected by the tort claim of strict products liability.21  The
California Supreme Court concluded that strict products liability “was
designed, not to undermine the warranty provisions of the sales act or
of the Uniform Commercial Code but, rather, to govern the distinct
problem of physical injuries.”22  Because the plaintiff had not suffered
physical injury, the defendant did not owe him a tort duty, barring tort
recovery for the pure economic losses caused by the truck’s defect.
In adopting this no-duty rule, the court relied on a contracting ratio-
nale that subsequently exerted considerable influence over other
courts.  After the plaintiff returned the truck, it was resold to another
trucker who used it for different purposes, and that trucker did not
16. Id. at 873–75.
17. 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965).
18. E. River S.S., 476 U.S. at 868–71 (citation omitted).
19. Id. at 147.
20. Id. at 148.
21. See id. at 148–49.
22. Id. at 149.
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experience any galloping.  The truck, therefore, was suitable for a
commercial use different from the commercial manner in which the
plaintiff had used the truck.  As the court observed, a product that
meets the specific commercial needs of one type of consumer but not
another is best handled by the contractual rules of warranty law:
If under these circumstances defendant is strictly liable in tort for
the commercial loss suffered by plaintiff, then it would be liable for
business losses of other truckers caused by the failure of its trucks to
meet the specific needs of their businesses, even though those needs
were communicated only to the dealer.  Moreover, this liability
could not be disclaimed, for one purpose of strict liability in tort is
to prevent a manufacturer from defining [under the product war-
ranty] the scope of his responsibility for harm caused by his prod-
ucts.  The manufacturer would be liable for damages of unknown
and unlimited scope.  Application of the rules of warranty prevents
this result.23
Unlike strict products liability, warranty law permits the parties to
contractually allocate responsibility for defects pursuant to their par-
ticular commercial needs.  According to the court, this limited role for
contracting is not inconsistent with the rule of strict products liability,
which is premised on the inability of consumers to contract fairly over
liability for physical harms:
A consumer should not be charged at the will of the manufacturer
with bearing the risk of physical injury when he buys a product on
the market.  He can, however, be fairly charged with the risk that
the product will not match his economic expectations unless the
manufacturer agrees that it will.
. . . .
Here, plaintiff, whose business is trucking, could have shopped
around until he found the truck that would fulfill his business needs.
He could be fairly charged with the risk that the product would not
match his economic expectations, unless the manufacturer agreed
that it would.24
This contracting rationale for barring tort claims of pure economic
loss was subsequently adopted and further refined by the U.S. Su-
preme Court in East River Steamship.25  As the Court explained:
When a product injures only itself the reasons for imposing a tort
duty are weak and those for leaving the party to its contractual rem-
edies are strong.
The tort concern with safety is reduced when an injury is only to
the product itself. . . .  [W]hen a product injures itself, the commer-
cial user stands to lose the value of the product, risks the displeasure
23. Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 150–51 (Cal. 1965) (citation omitted).
24. Id. at 151–52.
25. E. River S.S., 476 U.S. at 868–71.
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of its customers who find that the product does not meet their
needs, or, as in this case, experiences increased costs in performing
a service.  Losses like these can be insured.26
Like Seely, the reasoning in East River Steamship recognized that con-
tracting for pure economic losses has distinct value, and consumers
and manufacturers can fairly contract over this type of loss, even if
they cannot do so with respect to physical harms.
In the decades that followed East River Steamship, the majority of
appellate courts that considered the issue have adopted the East River
Steamship contracting rationale.  In doing so, these courts have often
rejected intermediate rules that recognize “an exception to the eco-
nomic loss doctrine based on unreasonably dangerous products; sud-
den, calamitous events; or both.”27  These courts have concluded that
a duty encompassing pure economic loss is not justified by the need to
protect endangered consumers, reasoning that “deterrence is ade-
quately promoted by existing law that permits tort recovery for per-
sonal injury and damage to property other than the product itself.”28
Even though the parties in these cases do not always have a direct
contractual relationship, courts still invoke the contracting rationale to
deny the tort claim.  The plaintiff-consumer typically purchased the
product from a retailer, whereas the defendant-manufacturer is usu-
ally an upstream supplier that may have directly contracted only with
the retailer or other intermediate distributors.  Even if there is no con-
tractual privity between the consumer and the manufacturer, courts
still recognize that the contracting rationale can justify barring tort
recovery in cases of near privity.  The parties are situated in a web of
contractual relationships that permits the shifting of losses through in-
demnification agreements among or between the various parties in the
chain of distribution, and the consumer can also look outside of this
contracting family to seek protection by other means, such as purchas-
ing insurance against pure economic losses or adopting other methods
(like maintaining a supply of spare parts) for minimizing the pure eco-
nomic losses caused by the defective product.  The contracting ratio-
nale only requires near privity between the plaintiff and defendant,
recognizing that the range of opportunities afforded by contracting in
these contexts means that “the potential victim ordinarily is best able
26. Id. at 871–72.
27. See, e.g., Giddings & Lewis, Inc. v. Indus. Risk Insurers, 348 S.W.3d 729, 733 (Ky. 2011);
Dobrovlny v. Ford Motor Co., 793 N.W.2d 445, 449–50 (Neb. 2011); Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co. v.
Detroit Diesel Corp., 293 S.W.3d 487, 492 (Tenn. 2009).
28. See, e.g., Lincoln Gen. Ins., 293 S.W.3d at 491.
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to work out alternative protective arrangements and need not rely on
tort law.”29
Most courts have adopted the contracting rationale articulated by
East River Steamship, making it the leading formulation of the eco-
nomic loss rule.30  As one federal court concluded in a case that re-
quired it to predict whether Pennsylvania law would recognize this
rule:
[East River Steamship] was not a paste and scissors job that set forth
the diverse holdings in myriad cases and then arbitrarily opted for
one view over the others.  The Court heeded the teaching of Lord
Mansfield: “The law does not consist in particular instances, though
it is explained by particular instances and rules; but the law consists
of principles, which govern specific and individual cases as they hap-
pen to arise.”  The Court identified, examined, and evaluated con-
trolling dogma, doctrine, and fundamental principles of tort and
contract remedies.  For these reasons, we are convinced that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court will adopt the analysis of [East River
Steamship].31
It is an open question, however, whether East River Steamship rep-
resents the triumph of substance over form.  The Court in East River
Steamship concluded that contracting and related measures ade-
quately protect against all forms of pure economic losses threatened
by defective products, eliminating any rationale for the tort duty.  The
Court, though, did not rigorously establish this conclusion, and no one
else has systematically applied the contracting rationale to the differ-
ent types of contracting problems in product cases.32  To determine
whether East River Steamship formulated the economic loss rule in a
substantively defensible manner, we must analyze the contracting ra-
tionale across the full range of cases.
III. CONTRACTING OVER PURE ECONOMIC LOSS
Courts have reasoned that a contracting rationale for the economic
loss rule is consistent with the tort duty governing physical harms.33
The difficulty posed by this reasoning is most easily illustrated by the
29. Rardin v. T & D Mach. Handling, Inc., 890 F.2d 24, 29 (7th Cir. 1989); see Grams v. Milk
Prods., Inc., 699 N.W.2d 167, 171 (Wis. 2005) (stating that one of the fundamental premises of
the economic loss rule is “to encourage the party best situated to assess the risk of economic loss,
[that is], the commercial purchaser, to assume, allocate, or insure against that risk” (alteration in
original)).
30. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 21 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST.
1998).
31. Aloe Coal Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 816 F.2d 110, 118 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting R. v. Bem-
bridge, 22 How. St. Tr. 2, 155 (K.B. 1783)).
32. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
33. See supra notes 23–28 and accompanying text.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-2\DPL202.txt unknown Seq: 10 15-JUL-16 11:12
402 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:393
rules governing contractual disclaimers or waivers of a product seller’s
tort liability for physical harms.
Courts have uniformly concluded that a contractual disclaimer or
waiver of tort liability “is so inimical to the public good as to compel
an adjudication of its invalidity.”34  As the Restatement (Third) of
Torts explains, courts do not enforce these provisions because “[i]t is
presumed that the ordinary product user or consumer lacks sufficient
information and bargaining power to execute a fair contractual limita-
tion of rights to recover.”35
Contractual limitations of tort liability are contrary to public policy
because they absolve product sellers of legal responsibility for supply-
ing overly unsafe products to poorly informed consumers.  Unless sell-
ers are legally responsible for product safety, they predictably reduce
safety investments to reduce their costs, yielding products with unrea-
sonable dangers that cannot be adequately discerned by uninformed
consumers.  The resultant safety problem justifies a tort duty that
makes sellers legally responsible for product safety independent from
their contractual obligations.36
This substantive rationale for the tort duty poses an evident prob-
lem for the economic loss rule.  Strict products liability is based on the
rationale that consumers cannot execute fair contractual limitations of
liability for physical harms, thereby justifying the imposition of a tort
duty on product sellers that cannot be limited by these contracts.  The
economic loss rule, by contrast, limits the tort duty on the ground that
consumers can fairly contract over limitations of liability in cases of
pure economic loss.  Can a rationale that rejects contracting over
physical harms be squared with a rationale that accepts contracting
over issues of pure economic loss?
In most cases, the informational problems that prevent consumers
from executing fair contractual limitations of liability for physical
harm do not prevent them from executing fair limitations of liability
for pure economic loss.  The structure of the contracting problem in
these cases, however, does not encompass all forms of pure economic
loss.  In an important class of cases, contracting over pure economic
loss is not substantively different from contracting over disclaimers or
waivers of tort liability for physical harm.  The same informational
problem that justifies the tort duty for physical harms also justifies the
34. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 95 (N.J. 1960).
35. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 18 cmt. a.
36. MARK A. GEISTFELD, PRINCIPLES OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 43–60 (2d ed. 2011) (explain-
ing why a tort duty can be justified whenever information costs prevent the ordinary consumer
from making informed decisions about product risks).
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tort duty for this type of pure economic loss.  A tort duty formulated
in terms of the contracting rationale, therefore, does not bar tort re-
covery for all forms of pure economic loss, contrary to the East River
Steamship formulation of the economic loss rule.
A. The Contracting Problem in Products Liability
To analyze the contracting problem involving pure economic losses
caused by defective products, we must first isolate the relevant con-
tracting issues.  Products liability addresses issues pertaining to prod-
uct safety and the compensation of product-caused injuries.  Because
manufacturers in mass product markets necessarily respond to aggre-
gate consumer demand as opposed to the particular demands of indi-
vidual consumers, the associated rules of products liability are defined
by reference to the average or ordinary consumer.37  For tort pur-
poses, the contracting problem reduces to the question of how the av-
erage or ordinary consumer would contract with the manufacturer
over issues of product safety and compensation for product-caused
injuries.
Consider an ordinary consumer who has already decided to
purchase a particular type of car.  The only remaining decision is
whether a particular safety device should be incorporated into the ve-
hicle’s design.  Suppose the safety device (like an airbag) only affects
the consumer (the purchaser and other users of the vehicle), eliminat-
ing the need to consider bystanders.38  The consumer’s decision of
whether to purchase this safety device depends on its cost and ex-
pected safety benefits—the issues of relevance to products liability.
In deciding whether to purchase this safety device, the consumer
accounts for its price and any other costs that she can expect to incur
because of it, such as replacement or maintenance costs.  The con-
37. See id. at 41–42; see also, e.g., Johnson v. Am. Standard, Inc., 179 P.3d 905, 916 (Cal. 2008)
(holding that the duty to warn in products liability cases “must be based on objective general
predictions of the anticipated user population’s knowledge, not case-by-case hindsight examina-
tions of the particular plaintiff’s subjective state of mind”).
38. One who buys a product frequently expects that it will be used by others, such as family
members or friends.  In making the purchase decision, the buyer presumably gives equal consid-
eration to the welfare of these other users.  The interests of these parties coincide, making it
defensible to conceptualize the consumer as including both the buyer and any reasonably fore-
seeable user of the product.  Consequently, “the connotation of ‘consumer’ [is] broader than that
of ‘buyer.’  He signifie[s] such a person who, in the reasonable contemplation of the parties to
the sale, might be expected to use the product.” Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 81.  The consumer, by
contrast, will not necessarily account for the interests of strangers when contracting over product
safety, so any contracting rationale for the economic loss rule will be inapplicable to bystanders.
Cf. GEISTFELD, supra note 36, at 309–20 (discussing the substantive differences between by- R
stander claims and consumer claims).
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sumer adds up all of these costs to determine the total cost or burden
(B) she would incur because of the safety device.  The consumer also
considers the safety benefit she would derive from this safety invest-
ment.  Without the protection provided by the device, the consumer
faces a higher probability of being injured in a crash and incurring the
associated costs.  Multiplying this probability (P) by the cost of injury
or loss (L) yields the expected injury costs (PL) of not having this
particular device.  To decide whether she should purchase the device,
the consumer compares the total cost or burden of the device with its
safety benefit (the amount by which the device would reduce the con-
sumer’s expected injury costs).  The consumer would find it worth-
while to demand that the automobile contain the safety device only if
its total costs are less than the total safety benefits:
cost of safety device B < increased injury costs without the device PL
The consumer must have adequate knowledge about both factors to
make informed contracting decisions regarding product safety.  For
example, suppose the ordinary consumer is unaware of a risk that
would be created by a design that does not incorporate a cost-effective
safety device (one for which B < PL).  If the consumer knew of the
risk, she would want to purchase the device.  Without knowledge of
the risk, however, the ordinary consumer is unaware of the safety
problem and unwilling to purchase the device (B > PL = 0).  Why
would one spend money to address a safety problem that she does not
think exists?
Lacking consumer demand, the manufacturer will not incorporate
the safety device into the design.  The manufacturer could create de-
mand for the device by voluntarily disclosing the associated risk to
consumers, but doing so would only increase consumer estimates of
product cost and decrease sales.  What is the point of advertising neg-
ative product attributes to the consumer?  The process of price com-
petition predictably forces manufacturers to forego these types of
safety investments, resulting in unreasonably dangerous products.
The safety problems caused by uninformed consumer choice, there-
fore, justify the tort duty.39
The tort duty accordingly governs any risk of physical harm for
which the ordinary consumer is unable to make an informed safety
decision.  By implication, the duty does not encompass safety deci-
39. GEISTFELD, supra note 36 at 43–48. R
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sions that can be made by the ordinary consumer on an adequately
informed basis.40
For these reasons, product sellers cannot disclaim tort liability
under the product warranty.  A contractual disclaimer or waiver of
liability operates against a tort duty, which in turn applies only to con-
tractual safety decisions that cannot be made by the ordinary con-
sumer on an informed basis.  The same safety problem that is
combated by the tort duty would be recreated by a contractual waiver
or disclaimer of the duty, justifying the judicial conclusion that these
contractual provisions violate public policy because “[i]t is presumed
that the ordinary product user or consumer lacks sufficient informa-
tion and bargaining power to execute a fair contractual limitation of
rights to recover.”41
As illustrated by contractual waivers of tort liability, the same infor-
mational problem that justifies the tort duty with respect to physical
harms extends to any other substantively identical contracting prob-
lem.  Whether courts should enforce contractual limitations of liability
for pure economic loss, therefore, depends on whether the contracting
problem is substantively identical to the one implicated by the tort
duty governing physical harms.
B. Contracting and the Ordinary Tort Duty in Cases
of Physical Harm
So far the analysis has shown that a fully informed consumer will
demand any safety device or precaution for which the cost or burden
B is less than the safety benefit or associated reduction of risk PL.  To
ensure that a product conforms to this decision-rule and thereby satis-
fies the ordinary consumer’s reasonable expectations of product
safety, the tort duty obligates the product seller to incorporate safety
precautions into the product whenever doing so is required by the
risk-utility test.42  The risk of a product design or warning that does
not contain a particular safety precaution refers to the increased risk
that the consumer will suffer injury due to this lack of protection—the
risk term PL in our prior analysis.  The utility of the existing design or
warning refers to the savings that are created by the omission of the
40. Id. at 48–54, 125–35 (using case law on categorical liability and optional safety equipment
to show why the tort duty does not apply to safety decisions that can be made by the ordinary
consumer on an informed basis).
41. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 18 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.
1998).
42. Id. §§ 2(b)–(c).  For reasons implied by this discussion, the risk-utility test is substantively
equivalent to the formulation of the consumer expectations test that considers product perform-
ance in relation to cost. See GEISTFELD, supra note 36 at 71–77. R
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safety precaution in question, which is an amount equal to the total
cost or burden B of the safety investment.  Under the risk-utility test,
the design or warning of a product is defective if the utility of not
incorporating a particular precaution into the design or warning (the
cost savings) is less than the risk that would thereby be eliminated:
B < PL.  Consequently, the risk-utility test deems a product defective
if it does not contain the safety precautions that would be chosen by
the ordinary consumer if she were well informed of the risk-utility
factors.
For cases in which a product defect proximately caused physical
harm—bodily injury or damage to real or tangible property other than
the product itself—tort law provides the plaintiff with the greatest
range of damage remedies.  In these cases, the plaintiff can receive
compensatory damages for the physical harm itself, consisting of both
the monetary and nonmonetary injuries caused by the harm, such as
medical expenses and pain and suffering.
Based on this specification of the tort duty, we can define the asso-
ciated contracting problem.  To do so, we must distinguish the eco-
nomic or monetary losses proximately caused by the predicate
physical harm (LEconomic⏐Physical) from the noneconomic or nonmonetary
losses proximately caused by that predicate physical harm
(LNoneconomic⏐Physical).  These two types of losses are encompassed by the
ordinary tort duty in product cases involving physical harm, which can
be compactly expressed in terms of the risk-utility test as requiring
product sellers to make any safety investment (with a cost or burden
B) that satisfies the following condition:
(1) B < P (LEconomic⏐Physical + LNoneconomic⏐Physical)
Any contractual disclaimer of this ordinary tort duty is unenforce-
able on the ground that the average consumer does not have sufficient
information to execute a fair limitation of liability.43  By implication,
the average consumer will not have sufficient information to disclaim
any other limitations of liability that turn on the same safety issue.
The enforceability of contractual disclaimers for liability over pure ec-
onomic loss depends on how the underlying contracting problem com-
pares to the safety decision expressed by Equation 1.
43. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 18 cmt. a.
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C. Contracting Over Liability for Pure Economic Loss
The contracting problem encompasses pure economic loss anytime
a product risk threatens economic losses that are mutually exclusive of
physical harm—only one or the other can occur, but not both.  But
even if the risk materializes into a pure economic loss, the amount of
loss can still depend on a future risk of physical harm (the financial
cost of repair, for example, can depend on the need to eliminate a risk
of physical harm).  For contracting purposes, a pure risk of economic
loss is both mutually exclusive of physical harm in the first instance
and is not dependent on any further risk that the product will cause
physical harm.
For example, the high-pressure turbine of a ship at issue in East
River Steamship malfunctioned during a storm in the Gulf of Alaska,
causing the ship to lose normal power.44  Despite this defect, the ship
still had enough power to complete its lengthy journey to the Panama
Canal and then to San Francisco.45  The circumstances in which the
defect first manifested itself only resulted in pure economic loss (the
increased time to complete the voyage and the expense of repairing
the turbine), but the outcome could have been different under an-
other set of circumstances.  If the storm had been sufficiently severe,
the loss of normal power could have caused the ship to founder and
sink, resulting in physical harm (bodily injury and damage to tangible
property unrelated to the ship itself).  Any safety investments that re-
duced the risk of a turbine malfunction, therefore, reduced both the
risk that the defect would cause physical harm and the mutually exclu-
sive risk that the defect would, instead, initially cause pure economic
loss.  If the total amount expended on repair only depended on the
need to avoid further economic losses (the increased time to complete
voyages), then the associated risk is one of pure economic loss for
contracting purposes.
Under these conditions, the contracting problem involves a product
risk that could cause the consumer to suffer either a physical harm
(with probability P1) or a pure economic loss (with mutually exclusive
probability P2) of an amount that can be determined without any fur-
ther reference to the problem of physical harm (LEconomic).  If the tort
duty were to encompass this type of pure economic loss, the ordinary
duty would be expanded from the risk of physical harm to include the
additional risk that the defect might cause pure economic loss:
44. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 860 (1986).
45. Id.
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(2) B < P1 (LEconomic⏐Physical + LNoneconomic⏐Physical) + P2 (LEconomic)
This expanded duty can require more product safety than the ordi-
nary duty, which is limited to cases of physical harm.46  The more ex-
pansive duty, though, cannot be justified on the ground that the
increased product safety is required to protect consumers from an un-
reasonable risk of physical harm.  That protection is already provided
by the ordinary duty governing physical harms.47
Because the ordinary tort duty fully regulates any safety problems
pertaining to the unreasonable risk of physical harm, the consumer
“has no duty to discover or guard against a product defect.”48  Freed
from the need to consider product defects that might cause physical
harm, the consumer’s contracting decision is limited to cases in which
such a defect only causes pure economic loss.
In contracting over losses of this type, the consumer can rely on the
implied warranty, which guarantees that the product is capable of per-
forming its intended function.49  Although the seller can expressly dis-
claim the implied product warranty with clear and conspicuous
language in the sales contract,50 doing so can alert otherwise unwary
consumers of the need to consider the problem of pure economic
losses caused by a defect in the product.51  The contractual transaction
is further regulated in most states by consumer protection statutes
that prohibit unfair and deceptive trade practices.52  The transaction,
therefore, is regulated in a manner that largely governs the safety
dimensions of the product, reducing the consumer’s contracting deci-
46. The added safety benefit for pure economic loss on the right-hand side of the equation can
justify an increase in safety expenditures on the left-hand side.
47. See supra Part III.B; cf. Trans States Airlines v. Pratt & Whitney Can., Inc., 682 N.E.2d 45,
53 (Ill. 1997) (“[W]e believe that the incentive to manufacture safe products remains unabated
under the [economic loss rule]. . . .  Where the product causes personal injury or other property
damage, the manufacturer may yet be subject to liability in tort.  Because no manufacturer can
predict with any certainty that the damage his unsafe product causes will be confined to the
product itself, tort liability will continue to loom as a possibility.  Therefore, in our view, the
incentive to build safe products is not diminished.”).
48. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Sanchez, 997 S.W.2d 584, 593 (Tex. 1999); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 17 cmt. d (“In general, [the] plaintiff has no reason
to expect that a new product contains a [defect] and would have little reason to be on guard to
discover it.”).
49. U.C.C. § 2-314 (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE
LAWS 2014).
50. Id. § 2-316(2).
51. Cf. Hiigel v. Gen. Motors Corp., 544 P.2d 983, 989–90 (Colo. 1975) (requiring that a dis-
claimer be clearly brought to the attention of a noncommercial buyer to be enforceable).
52. Jean Braucher, Deception, Economic Loss and Mass-Market Customers: Consumer Protec-
tion Statutes as Persuasive Authority in the Common Law of Fraud, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 829, 830–31
(2006).
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sion to issues concerning the amount of pure economic loss that could
be caused by a defect and the methods for insuring or protecting
against these losses.
In this limited respect, the ordinary consumer has better informa-
tion than the product seller.  The benefits that a consumer receives
from the product depend on how the product is used.  For example, a
recording device can be used for capturing a mundane conversation or
a musical performance with vast commercial potential.  A defect that
renders the device unable to perform the recording function would
cause substantially different economic losses in the two contexts.  In
most cases, however, the manufacturer does not know how a con-
sumer will use the product.  By contrast, the consumer knows how the
product will be used and has better information about the amount of
financial harms, like lost profits, that could be caused by a product
malfunction.
Consistent with this reasoning, courts bar tort recovery for pure ec-
onomic losses caused by a product defect for the “basic reason” that
the manufacturer “could not estimate the consequences of [its] care-
lessness.”53  The consumer’s superior information about the extent of
pure economic loss undergirds the contracting rationale for the eco-
nomic loss rule.
Based on her superior information about economic loss, the ordi-
nary consumer can adequately protect her interests by either con-
tracting with the seller for more extended warranty coverage,
purchasing other types of insurance, or obtaining other forms of pro-
tection, such as a supply of spare parts.  The consumer may also have
additional reasons for protecting against the risk of pure economic
loss that are unrelated to the particular threat posed by a defective
product.  A commercial party, for example, worries about the pros-
pect of lost profits caused by a variety of accidents (e.g., floods or
fires), which often make it worthwhile to purchase business-interrup-
tion insurance.54  The insurance decision does not ordinarily turn on
53. Rardin v. T & D Mach. Handling, Inc., 890 F.2d 24, 26 (7th Cir. 1989) (discussing the
negligent performance of contracts more generally).
54. “Business interruption insurance is written to cover virtually any type of commercial busi-
ness in existence today.” David A. Borghesi, Business Interruption Insurance—A Business Per-
spective, 17 NOVA L. REV. 1147, 1149 (1993).
[T]o have a recoverable business interruption loss under standard insurance contracts
typically found today, five criteria must be met.  The insured must have: 1) physical
damage; 2) to insured property; 3) caused by a covered peril; 4) resulting in a measura-
ble business interruption loss; 5) for the period required to expeditiously restore the
damaged property.
Id. at 1151.  The specifics of the policy determine whether a loss is covered, but some “not so
unique loss experiences” include the case in which “[a] food manufacturer must shut down its
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the incremental risk of lost profits caused by a defect in a particular
product.  In light of the threat of lost profits posed by the full range of
other risks, it is either worth purchasing the insurance, or it is not.
Under these conditions, the commercial party can adequately protect
against the risk of lost profits without having to consider the risk
posed by a particular defective product.  But even when such a prod-
uct risk merits separate consideration, the consumer has both the
knowledge and opportunity to protect her pure economic interests by
contracting and related protective measures.
Unlike cases of physical harm, insurance can adequately protect the
consumer in cases of pure economic loss.  Since at least the seven-
teenth century, the common law has defined an injury as being “irrep-
arable” if it “cannot be adequately measured or compensated by
money.”55  Physical harm is a type of irreparable injury, and, for cen-
turies, the common law has recognized that the prevention of such an
injury is better than imperfect compensation via the damages rem-
edy.56  Pure economic loss, by contrast, is the paradigmatic example of
a harm that can be fully compensated by money.  One dollar of lost
profits can be fully indemnified by $1 of insurance coverage.  Insur-
ance provides an important reason why contracting can adequately
protect the consumer’s interest in avoiding pure economic losses, fur-
ther explaining why a tort duty encompassing these harms is not
needed to protect the consumer interests at stake.57
D. Contracting for the Provision of Services
In addition to governing product cases, the economic loss rule also
bars tort recovery for “economic injuries resulting from the breach of
operations because of viral contamination.” Id. at 1151–52.  The source of a viral contamination
could stem from a product malfunction, illustrating how the risk posed by a particular defective
product can be a component of a larger insurance decision faced by a commercial actor.
55. Mark A. Geistfeld, The Principle of Misalignment: Duty, Damages, and the Nature of Tort
Liability, 121 YALE L.J. 142, 159 (2011). See generally Injury, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY  (10th
ed. 2014).
56. See Geistfeld, supra note 55, at 145. R
57. This conclusion is not limited to commercial parties and does not depend on the con-
sumer’s wealth, making this contracting rationale for the economic loss rule more general than
the one developed by William K. Jones, Product Defects Causing Commercial Loss: The Ascen-
dancy of Contract over Tort, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 731, 794–97 (1990) (explaining why commer-
cial parties are able to protect their pure economic interests by contracting, but concluding that
when individual consumers are the buyers, “because of limitations on consumer knowledge and
because of disparities in consumer wealth, it cannot be said that contractual reallocations of risk
are economically efficient and socially acceptable in the general run of manufacturer-consumer
transactions”).
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other sorts of contracts.”58  As one court explained, the principle that
parties facing a risk of pure economic loss can protect these interests
by contracting and related protective measures provides “ampl[e] sup-
port [for] applying the rule to products and services alike.”59
The extension of the contracting rationale to service contracts is de-
fensible for reasons made clear by the prior analysis of the contracting
problem.  That analysis does not depend on whether the risk is posed
by a product or service, so the contracting conclusions applicable to
product cases generalize to the provision of services.60
To be sure, product contracts are governed by the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (U.C.C.), which includes the implied warranty that the
product is fit for its intended purpose, whereas service contracts are
not governed by the U.C.C.  Due to this difference, some courts have
refused to extend the economic loss rule from product contracts to
contracts involving the provision of services.61
The consumer of a service contract, however, is still protected by
other legal rules.  For example, “the common law of contracts has well
developed rules of interpretation and doctrines to protect the reasona-
ble expectations of the parties.”62  More importantly for present pur-
poses, the consumer of a service contract is protected by a tort duty
requiring the seller to adopt reasonable precautions for reducing the
risk of physical harm.  These legal rules considerably simplify the con-
sumer’s contracting decision regarding pure economic loss.
As in product cases, the ordinary tort duty fully regulates the man-
ner by which the contractual performance unreasonably threatens
physical harm, limiting the consumer’s contracting decision to whether
it is worth taking measures to protect against such a negligent per-
formance that only causes pure economic loss.  As in product cases,
the consumer in this limited respect ordinarily has enough information
to rely on the contract or other measures like insurance to protect
against the pure economic losses caused by such a negligent perform-
58. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM § 3 cmt. a (AM. LAW
INST., Tentative Draft. No. 1, 2012).
59. Indianapolis-Marion Cty. Pub. Library v. Charlier Clark & Linard, P.C., 929 N.E.2d 722,
742 (Ind. 2010).
60. In the formal analysis developed in the prior section, the risk of product-caused injury (P)
can be redefined as the risk of injury caused by performance of the service contract.  Aside from
the exceptions discussed in the text infra, the remainder of the analysis stays the same.
61. See, e.g., Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cease Elec. Inc., 688 N.W.2d 462, 469 (Wis. 2004) (citing
Cargill, Inc. v. Boag Cold Storage Warehouse, 71 F.3d 545, 550 (6th Cir. 1995) and McCarthy
Well Co. v. St. Peter Creamery, Inc., 410 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Minn. 1987) as two courts in agree-
ment with this decision)).
62. Indianapolis-Marion Cty. Pub. Library, 929 N.E.2d at 742.
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ance.  The contracting rationale for limiting the tort duty extends from
product cases to service cases.
By implication, the contracting rationale does not justifiably bar
tort recovery for pure economic loss if the ordinary consumer is not
well informed about the relevant factors.  Consider contracts for the
provision of legal advice or other professional services that do not
threaten physical harm.  Because there is no risk of physical harm im-
plicated by the contracting decision, the client cannot rely on the ordi-
nary tort duty to guarantee that the professional will exercise
reasonable care.  The client must instead evaluate the entire risk that
the professional will commit malpractice. According to the Restate-
ment (Third) of Torts, “most clients do not know enough to protect
themselves by inspecting the professional’s work or by other indepen-
dent means.”63  The ordinary client is unable to make adequately in-
formed contracting decisions, justifying the rule that “[a] professional
is subject to liability in tort for economic loss caused by the negligent
performance of an undertaking to serve a client.”64
The tort duty in malpractice cases effectively requires a professional
to provide the quality of care that would be demanded by the ordi-
nary, well-informed client.  The duty is often described by courts “as a
‘customary’ or ‘professional’ standard of care.”65  This amount of care
would presumably be chosen by the ordinary client if she were well
informed about the matter, so the tort duty supports the contracting
relationship by solving the informational problem.  As illustrated by
the tort duty governing professional malpractice, the contracting ratio-
nale does not uniformly bar tort recovery for pure economic loss but
only applies when the ordinary client or consumer does not have the
requisite information for protecting her interests by contracting.
E. Defects That Threaten Both Pure Economic Loss
and Physical Harm
Recognizing that strict products liability “was designed . . .  to gov-
ern the distinct problem of physical injuries,”66 some courts have
adopted an exception to the economic loss rule if the plaintiff alleges
“facts that demonstrate that the product at issue creates a dangerous
condition, one that gives rise to a clear danger or death or personal
63. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 4 cmt. a.
64. Id. § 4.
65. Id. § 4 cmt. c.
66. Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 149 (Cal. 1965).
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injury.”67  This approach distinguishes between “disappointed users
. . . and the endangered ones,” permitting only the latter to recover
tort damages for pure economic loss.68
This intermediate rule recognizes that claims by endangered con-
sumers implicate their interest in physical security, making them sub-
stantively different from other claims for pure economic loss.
The line that is drawn usually depends on the nature of the defect
and the manner in which the damage occurred.  Defects of quality,
evidenced by internal deterioration or breakdown, are assigned to
the economic loss category, while the loss stemming from defects
that cause accidents “of violence or collision with external objects”
is treated as physical injury.  Tort law traditionally has redressed in-
juries properly classified as physical harm.69
This formulation of an intermediate rule cannot be squared with the
contracting rationale. As established by the prior analysis, the ordi-
nary consumer can adequately protect her interests by contracting
over risks of pure economic loss that are both mutually exclusive of
physical harm in the first instance and not dependent on any risk of
future physical harm.  These risk characteristics solely pertain to the
type of economic loss and not the manner in which the defect causes
injury. Regardless of how such a risk first materializes into injury—
whether through gradual deterioration or a sudden accident—the or-
dinary consumer can adequately protect against these pure economic
losses by contracting and related protective measures.  A formulation
of the economic loss rule that is wholly defined by the manner in
which the loss occurs cannot be justified by the contracting rationale
It does not follow, however, that the contracting rationale can never
justify tort recovery for the pure economic losses caused by a defec-
tive product.  The analysis so far has only considered defects that pose
a pure risk of economic loss—one that initially causes either physical
harm or a pure economic loss that does not depend on a risk of future
physical harm.  A complete analysis of the contracting problem must
address all types of economic loss, including those for which the
amount of economic loss depends on a future risk of physical harm.
67. Lloyd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 916 A.2d 257, 266 (Md. 2007) (relying on this rule to certify a
class action for the cost of repairing an allegedly dangerous defect in automobiles).
68. Russell v. Ford Motor Co., 575 P.2d 1383, 1387 (Or. 1979).
69. Pa. Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165, 1169–70 (3d Cir. 1981),
abrogated by Aloe Coal Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 816 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1987) (footnotes omitted)
(quoting Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 917, 918
(1966)).
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F. Contracting Over the Financial Costs of Safety Protection
In cases involving a so-called “unmanifested” defect, the consumer
purchases the product and subsequently learns about a defect that
could cause physical harm; however, that event has not yet occurred—
the defect has not yet manifested itself.  The looming threat of physi-
cal harm can make it cost-effective to repair the defect or mitigate the
risk with other precautionary measures.  The contracting decision over
responsibility for these costs fundamentally differs from the problem
of contracting over disappointed economic expectations.
To see why, consider a class action suit filed against an automobile
manufacturer seeking recovery for “the cost to repair defective
seatbacks, which allegedly have a tendency to collapse in rear-impact
collisions, causing, in some cases, serious bodily injury or death to
drivers and/or passengers in the class vehicles.”70  To eliminate this
risk, the defect in the seatbacks must be repaired.  A well-informed
consumer would want the manufacturer to repair the defect if the
manufacturer was the least-cost avoider and the cost of repair was less
than the risk that the defective seatbacks would cause physical harm
in the event of an accident:
(3) BRepair < P(LEconomic⏐Physical + LNoneconomic⏐Physical)
The consumer’s repair decision is limited to the same substantive
interests that are otherwise protected by the ordinary tort duty (com-
pare Equation 1 and Equation 3).  The defective seats work perfectly
well in normal driving situations and do not disappoint the consumer’s
expectations in any respect other than the risk of physical harm; the
defect is of concern only during crashes.  The defect directly impli-
cates the consumer’s interest in physical security, not the economic
interest pertaining to lost product value.  The nature of the repair de-
cision, therefore, is substantively equivalent to the safety decision gov-
erned by the ordinary duty of care.
Due to the substantive equivalence of these two safety decisions,
contracting problems that plague one decision can extend to the other.
As recognized by the substantive rationale for the ordinary tort duty
governing physical harms, the consumer does not have the requisite
risk-utility information for determining whether the car has defective
seats at the time of purchase, which is why this particular safety deci-
sion is governed by the ordinary tort duty and not contracting.71  If the
70. Lloyd, 916 A.2d at 262.
71. See supra Part III.A.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-2\DPL202.txt unknown Seq: 23 15-JUL-16 11:12
2016] ECONOMIC LOSS RULE IN TORT LAW 415
consumer does not know about the defective seats at the time of
purchase, she also does not have the requisite risk-utility information
to contract over responsibility for repairing an unknown defect that
only becomes manifest after purchase.  The contracting problem with
respect to physical harms extends to repair decisions for preventing
future physical harms—a form of pure economic loss.
For tort purposes, this type of contracting problem fundamentally
differs from the one involving the risk of pure economic losses that
can be determined without any reference to a further risk of physical
harm (compare Equation 2 with Equation 3).  In both cases, the two
types of loss are mutually exclusive—the defect initially causes either
physical harm or pure economic loss, but not both.  This similarity,
however, masks an important difference.  In one case, the pure risk of
economic loss involves an amount of loss that can be determined inde-
pendently of physical harm, limiting the consumer’s contracting deci-
sion to her economic expectations.  But in the other case involving the
economic loss of repair, the total amount of loss depends on the safety
benefit of reducing the risk of future physical harm.  The repair deci-
sion depends on the underlying risk of physical harm, so contracting
over this form of pure economic loss necessarily implicates the con-
sumer’s interest in physical security.
Due to this difference in the substantive interests implicated by the
contracting decision, the consumer’s ability to execute fair contractual
disclaimers for one type of economic loss does not enable her to exe-
cute fair contractual disclaimers with respect to the other type of eco-
nomic loss.  The contracting rationale for the economic loss rule,
therefore, bars tort claims for one type of pure economic loss (e.g.,
lost profits) but not the pure economic loss of cost-effective or reason-
able repair to prevent future physical harm.
Between these two extremes are “mixed” cases in which repair of
the defect would reduce the risk of physical harm and any further eco-
nomic losses that the consumer would otherwise incur due to the de-
fect.  Returning to the example provided by East River Steamship,
repair of the defective turbine would enable the ship to operate at
normal power, thereby reducing both the risk of physical harm (the
chance that the reduced power of the ship could cause it to sink in a
storm) and the economic losses stemming from the defect (the in-
creased time of voyages caused by the reduced power).72  For such a
72. See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text (describing the defect at issue in East River
Steamship).
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mixed repair decision, the consumer’s contracting problem takes the
following form:
(4) BRepair < P(LEconomic⏐Physical + LNoneconomic⏐Physical) + LEconomic
In East River Steamship, the risk of physical harm was quite low.
Because the shipper knew of the defect, it could avoid voyages into
areas with impending storms, limiting the risk to the onset of severe
storms that were unexpected.  The amount of economic loss, by con-
trast, was quite large—all voyages would take considerably longer—
and presumably sufficient to justify the repair:
(5) BRepair < LEconomic
The shipper-consumer knew about the increased cost of longer voy-
ages, and, in light of that cost, could determine how to contractually
allocate responsibility for repair, eliminating the substantive rationale
for a tort duty.  For reasons illustrated by East River Steamship, the
contracting rationale for the economic loss rule is valid in mixed cases
of repair if the repair would be cost-effective without any considera-
tion of the extent to which it would also reduce the risk of future phys-
ical harm.
As shown by the varied issues involving the repair of defective
products that threaten physical harm, not all types of economic loss
implicate the same contracting problem. Contracting over one type of
pure economic loss implicates the same informational problem that
justifies the tort duty in the first instance, whereas the other type does
not.  The contracting rationale permits tort recovery for the first cate-
gory of economic harms and bars recovery for the second, justifying
an intermediate rule formulated in this manner.  For reasons estab-
lished by the contracting rationale, the economic loss rule cannot bar
recovery for all types of pure economic loss if consumers are to be
adequately protected from the unreasonable risk of physical harm.
IV. THE CONTRACTUALLY BASED INTERMEDIATE
ECONOMIC LOSS RULE
Under the majority rule governing product cases, “if a plaintiff suf-
fers economic loss not caused by damage to the plaintiff’s person or
other property, that type of loss is to be governed by the U.C.C.”73
The majority rule bars tort recovery by looking only at the form of the
73. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 21 reporters’ note, cmt. d (AM.
LAW INST. 1998).
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alleged injury, although courts have sought to substantively justify this
rule with a contracting rationale for limiting the tort duty.74
Form, however, does not always follow substance in the realm of
pure economic loss.  The contracting rationale for a limited tort duty
must be squared with the safety rationale for strict products liability,
which rejects contractual limitations of the ordinary tort duty gov-
erning physical harms.75  These disclaimers or waivers of tort liability
are rendered unenforceable as a matter of public policy because con-
sumers are unable to make informed contracting decisions about the
risk of physical harm.  The identical informational problem can also
plague the ordinary consumer’s contracting decisions regarding the fi-
nancial costs of preventing future physical harms threatened by an
“unmanifested” defect.76  The contracting rationale for the limited
duty is not valid in these cases, yet the majority rule bars tort recovery
simply because the claim is for pure economic loss.  The majority rule
is substantively at odds with the safety rationale for strict products
liability and unsupported by the contracting rationale for limiting the
tort duty.
Some courts have recognized that the majority rule does not ade-
quately protect endangered consumers, but they adopted an interme-
diate rule that is based on the manner in which the defect first
becomes manifest rather than on the contracting rationale.77  A differ-
ent intermediate rule is regarded by the contracting rationale.
The appropriate intermediate rule has been implicitly recognized by
most courts in adopting two important exceptions to the majority rule
that purportedly bars recovery for all types of pure economic loss.  In
cases seeking tort recovery for the pure financial costs of either medi-
cal monitoring or asbestos abatement, courts do not bar the claims
under the economic loss rule and often ignore the rule altogether.
The mere fact that a defective product causes only pure economic loss
in these two contexts does not bar tort recovery under the economic
loss rule.  Identifying the underlying logic of these widely recognized
exceptions shows that courts have effectively adopted the appropriate
contractually based intermediate rule across the full range of product
and service cases.
74. See supra Part II.
75. See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text.
76. See supra Part III.E.
77. See supra Part III.F.
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A. Tort Claims for the Financial Cost of Medical Monitoring
Tort claims for the cost of medical monitoring involve product de-
fects that have exposed the plaintiff-consumers to a significant risk of
incurring future bodily injury.  For example, in the cases involving the
diet-drug combination popularly known as Fen-Phen, the defects in-
volved the failure of the two drug warnings to disclose the risk that the
drug combination might cause heart-valve damage.78  Due to the na-
ture of this risk exposure, a plaintiff who does not yet have heart-valve
damage could suffer that injury in the future.  To protect herself, the
plaintiff must undergo periodic, costly medical testing.  Consequently,
the plaintiff seeks tort recovery for these medical monitoring costs on
the ground that the need to incur these expenses was foreseeably
caused by the defective warnings on the two drugs.
Without proof of an existing, compensable physical harm caused by
the defect, the plaintiff’s tort claim for the financial costs of medical
monitoring is a form of pure economic loss that would seem to be
straightforwardly barred by the majority rule.  Nevertheless, recovery
for these claims is permitted in about one-half of the jurisdictions that
have addressed the matter.79
“Among the jurisdictions generally permitting recovery of medical
monitoring in the absence of physical injury, there is little unanimity
in terms of explanations for departing from the traditional physical
injury rule.”80  These courts, however, all agree that these tort claims
78. In re Pa. Diet Drugs Litig., No. 9709-3162, 1999 WL 962583, at *2, *17 (Pa. Com. Pl. Mar.
12, 1999).
79. D. Scott Aberson, Note, A Fifty-State Survey of Medical Monitoring and the Approach the
Minnesota Supreme Court Should Take When Confronted with the Issue, 32 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1095, 1114 (2006) (“Currently, courts in at least thirteen states plus the District of Colum-
bia and Guam recognize medical monitoring absent present physical injury.  [By contrast], courts
in sixteen states plus the Virgin Islands appear to allow medical monitoring only if the plaintiffs
can show present physical injury.  The remaining jurisdictions either have not articulated a test
or have not addressed the issue of medical monitoring.”).  Since this survey was completed, one
of the states (Nevada) that previously rejected monitoring claims absent a present physical injury
now recognizes those claims. See Sadler v. PacifiCare of Nev., Inc., 340 P.3d 1264, 1269–70
(Nev. 2014).  Another state (New York) that had recognized those claims now rejects them. See
Caronia v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 5 N.E. 3d 11, 18–19 (N.Y. 2013).  Courts from at least two
other jurisdictions not accounted for in the survey now recognize these tort claims. See, e.g.,
Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 914 N.E.2d 891, 900–04 (Mass. 2009); Meyer ex rel. Coplin
v. Fluor Corp., 220 S.W.3d 712, 717 (Mo. 2007) (en banc).  However, the case law remains di-
vided; courts in at least three other jurisdictions have rejected monitoring claims without proof
of a present physical harm. See, e.g., Parker v. Wellman, 230 F. App’x. 878, 881–84 (11th Cir.
2007) (applying Georgia law); Paz v. Brush Engineered Materials, Inc., 949 So.2d 1, 3, 5, 9 (Miss.
2007); Lowe v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 183 P.3d 181, 186–87 (Or. 2008).
80. Lowe v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., 142 P.3d 1079, 1083 (Or. Ct. App. 2006), aff’d, 183 P.3d
181 (Or. 2008).
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implicate the interest in physical security—the core concern of tort
law.  As the court in a leading case explained:
[I]n light of the Restatement (Second) of Torts’ definition of “in-
jury,” we are not obliged to accept [defendant’s] implicit claim that
undergoing diagnostic examinations does not in itself constitute in-
jury.  The Restatement broadly defines injury as “the invasion of any
legally protected interest of another.” It is difficult to dispute that an
individual has an interest in avoiding expensive diagnostic examina-
tions just as he or she has an interest in avoiding physical injury.
When a defendant negligently invades this interest, the injury to
which is neither speculative nor resistant to proof, it is elementary
that the defendant should make the plaintiff whole by paying for the
examinations.81
The individual interest in avoiding periodic medical testing is no dif-
ferent from the interest in avoiding physical harm.  Each involves the
interest in physical security that clearly falls within the purview of tort
law and not contract law.  The tort-contract boundary is not impli-
cated, rendering the economic loss rule irrelevant, even though the
tort recovery is for the pure economic loss of medical monitoring.82
An instructive example is provided by California law.  Recall that in
East River Steamship, the U.S. Supreme Court extensively relied on
the California Supreme Court’s decision in Seely to support the rule
barring tort recovery for pure economic loss in all product cases.83
California law, however, permits tort recovery for the pure economic
loss of medical monitoring under certain conditions.
According to the California Supreme Court, plaintiffs can obtain
tort recovery for the financial costs of medical monitoring without
having suffered a predicate compensable physical harm because: (1)
“there is an important public health interest in fostering access to
medical testing for individuals whose exposure to toxic chemicals cre-
ates an enhanced risk of disease, particularly in light of the value of
early diagnosis and treatment for many cancer patients”; (2) “there is
a deterrence value in recognizing medical surveillance claims”;84 and
(3) “the availability of a substantial remedy before the consequences
of the plaintiffs’ exposure are manifest may also have the beneficial
81. Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 826 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (third emphasis added) (citation omitted).
82. Cf. Sapp v. Ford Motor Co., 687 S.E.2d 47, 48–49 (S.C. 2009) (“The purpose of the eco-
nomic loss rule is to define the line between recovery in tort and recovery in contract.  Contract
law seeks to protect the expectancy interests of the parties.  Tort law, on the other hand, seeks to
protect safety interests and is rooted in the concept of protecting society as a whole from physi-
cal harm to person or property.”).
83. See supra notes 17–27 and accompanying text.
84. Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 824 (Cal. 1993).
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effect of preventing or mitigating serious future illnesses and thus re-
duce the overall costs to the responsible parties.”85  In recognizing
these tort claims, the court neither mentioned the economic loss rule
nor cited to its earlier opinion in Seely, which was “the case that cre-
ated the majority land-based approach” to the problem of economic
loss according to East River Steamship.86  Unlike the East River
Steamship formulation of the economic loss rule, California law does
not always bar consumers from tort recovery for pure economic loss in
product cases.
Courts that have rejected medical monitoring claims also do not in-
voke the economic loss rule.  “Among the courts rejecting medical
monitoring claims in the absence of an allegation or proof of physical
injury, the analysis generally has been more uniform: such claims are
inconsistent with the general rule of tort liability requiring proof of
physical harm.”87  Some have rejected monitoring claims based on the
policy concern that without an existing compensable physical injury,
there could be a “potential flood of litigation stemming from unsub-
stantiated or fabricated prospective harms.”88  A related policy con-
cern is that the standard for tort recovery is too vague, resulting in
inconsistent or unpredictable outcomes.89  Courts have also found
monitoring claims to be problematic due to the possibility that these
recoveries would “deplet[e] the purported tortfeasor’s resources,”
which in turn “would lead to the inequitable diversion of money away
from those who have actually sustained an injury as a result of the
exposure.”90  This last policy concern is particularly interesting be-
cause it persuasively justifies the limitation of the tort duty for pure
economic loss in noncontractual settings.91  None of these policy con-
85. Id. (quoting Ayers v. T.W.P of Jackson, 106 N.J. 557, 604 (1987)).
86. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 868 (1986).
87. Lowe v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 142 P.3d 1079, 1084 (Or. Ct. App. 2006).
88. Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 82 S.W.3d 849, 859 (Ky. 2002); see also, e.g., Metro-North
Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 442–44 (1997) (rejecting plaintiffs’ asbestos claim
under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act for a medical-monitoring remedy absent a present
physical injury, in part, due to the concern that “tens of millions of individuals may have suffered
exposure to substances that might justify some form of substance-exposure-related medical
monitoring”).
89. Adam P. Joffe, Note, The Medical Monitoring Remedy: Ongoing Controversy and a Pro-
posed Solution, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 663, 677 (2009).
90. Caronia v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 5 N.E.3d 11, 18 (N.Y. 2013); see also Hinton ex rel.
Hinton v. Monsanto Co., 813 So. 2d 827, 830–31 (Ala. 2001) (rejecting monitoring claims in part
because of the possibility of “vast testing liability adversely affecting the allocation of scarce
medical resources” (quoting Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 521 U.S. at 442).
91. MARK A. GEISTFELD, TORT LAW: THE ESSENTIALS 161–72 (2008) (showing why tort re-
covery for pure economic loss or stand-alone emotional harms in noncontractual settings is justi-
fiably limited by the categorical policy concern that these claims would deplete the ordinary
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cerns address the importance of maintaining the boundary between
tort and contract law.  Courts that reject tort claims for medical moni-
toring do so without reliance on the economic loss rule, presumably
because these tort claims so obviously implicate the plaintiff’s interest
in physical security and fall outside the purview of contract law.92
Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has also implicitly recognized that
the viability of monitoring claims does not depend on the economic
loss rule.  In a case rejecting tort claims for medical monitoring, the
Court did not discuss the economic loss rule or cite to its earlier deci-
sion in East River Steamship.93  As the Court apparently recognized,
the contracting rationale for the economic loss rule in East River
Steamship is inapposite for medical monitoring claims—a conclusion
confirmed by our prior analysis of the contracting problem for precau-
tionary measures of this type.94
This split in case law concerning tort recovery for medical monitor-
ing yields important insights as to how courts interpret the economic
loss rule.  The majority formulation of the economic loss rule would
bar recovery in these cases because the form of the claim is only for a
financial loss (the expense of medical monitoring), yet courts do not
rely on this rule to evaluate the claim.  By invoking other reasons, a
strong plurality permits recovery while another denies the tort claim.
In doing so, all of these courts have effectively recognized that the
economic loss rule is not triggered simply because an endangered con-
sumer seeks tort damages for the financial cost of protecting against
tortfeasor’s assets and effectively prevent physically harmed victims from full recovery).  This
rationale is much less persuasive in contractual settings because the duty holder’s expected tort
liabilities are a cost of the contract that is included in the price.  Unless the duty holder under-
prices the contract or otherwise purchases an insufficient amount of liability insurance, she
would have sufficient resources to pay all valid tort claims.
92. Under the most expansive definition of the economic loss rule, the doctrine applies to the
denial of any tort claim for pure economic loss. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.  Under R
this definition, the doctrine necessarily encompasses the denial of tort claims for medical moni-
toring costs.  The economic loss rule, however, does not explain the denial of these claims when
more narrowly defined by its primary purpose of maintaining the tort-contract boundary—the
definition employed throughout this Article and adopted by most courts. See id.
93. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 521 U.S. at 440–41.
94. See supra Part III.F.  For reasons not yet recognized by the courts, the contracting ratio-
nale could be extended to monitoring claims.  Medical monitoring expenditures could be cov-
ered by health insurance.  In light of the federal mandate known as Obamacare, the average or
ordinary consumer would probably purchase the requisite health insurance regardless of the risk
posed by a particular product. See generally Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsi-
bility After the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577, 1580–92
(2011) (describing the federal law mandating health coverage).  Insofar as the average or ordi-
nary consumer would find insurance coverage to be worthwhile independent of the particular
risks posed by a product defect, she can adequately protect her interests by contracting. See
supra Part III.C.
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future physical harms.  To explain these cases, the economic loss rule
must be formulated in an intermediate manner that can permit tort
recovery for these endangered consumers and bar recovery for other
types of disappointed product users.
B. Tort Claims for the Financial Cost of Asbestos Abatement
In response to the health hazards posed by asbestos, the federal
government and many states have enacted statutes requiring the re-
moval or segregation of asbestos-containing materials from schools
and other public buildings.95  Private homeowners have also under-
taken these abatement measures to protect themselves from being ex-
posed to the risk of incurring life-threatening asbestos-related injuries,
such as asbestosis or mesothelioma.  The abatement measures are
quite expensive, leading property owners to seek tort compensation
for the costs of reducing the unreasonable risks posed by defective
asbestos-containing products.
In defending against these tort claims, asbestos manufacturers and
suppliers have invoked the economic loss rule.  The argument would
seem to be incontrovertible.  The asbestos-containing material is only
a component of the building or product.  Thus, the defect has dam-
aged only the product itself (the building), which then caused the con-
sequential economic harms of abatement costs.  The same facts are
present in East River Steamship, in which each defective turbine
caused damage only to the product itself (the ship), which then caused
consequential economic harms of repair costs.  As in East River
Steamship, the economic loss rule would seem to require dismissal of
these tort claims.
“In fact, most courts have done just the opposite, freely allowing
property owners to sue in tort by adopting a ‘liberal’ definition of
physical injury.”96  By holding that asbestos-containing material dam-
ages other property instead of the product itself, these cases do not
technically violate the economic loss rule; however, these holdings are
unpersuasive because asbestos-containing products are usually com-
ponents of an integrated final product (the building).  Moreover, “as-
bestos-containing materials do not physically alter any part of the
building or impair its structural integrity.”97  Indeed, the building
materials containing asbestos continue to perform the intended func-
tion of being fire resistant.  The only reason to remove asbestos-con-
95. The material in this paragraph is drawn from Richard C. Ausness, Tort Liability for Asbes-
tos Removal Costs, 73 OR. L. REV. 505, 508–11 (1994).
96. Id. at 530.
97. Id. at 532.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-2\DPL202.txt unknown Seq: 31 15-JUL-16 11:12
2016] ECONOMIC LOSS RULE IN TORT LAW 423
taining materials is to reduce the substantial risk that occupants will
suffer physical harm, not to restore the proper functioning of the
building.  Consequently, the asbestos-abatement cases effectively in-
volve an exception to the majority rule on economic loss.
This exception to the economic loss rule is recognized by the Re-
statement (Third) of Torts:
One category of claims stands apart.  In the case of asbestos con-
tamination in buildings, most courts have taken the position that the
contamination constitutes harm to the building as other property.
The serious health threat caused by asbestos contamination has led
the courts to this conclusion.  Thus, actions seeking recovery for the
costs of asbestos removal have been held to be within the purview
of products liability law rather than commercial law.98
By recognizing that the economic loss rule does not apply to asbes-
tos-abatement cases, courts have effectively concluded that the rule is
inapplicable to tort claims seeking to reasonably protect endangered
consumers from future physical harm.  Not only do consumers lack
the information necessary to contract fairly with manufacturers over
the allocation of these liabilities, they also cannot ordinarily procure
insurance covering the cost of asbestos abatement.99  The contracting
rationale completely breaks down in these cases, explaining why
courts have refused to invoke the economic loss rule to bar these tort
claims.
To be sure, the courts in these cases did not explain why the con-
tracting rationale permits tort recovery for the financial costs of asbes-
tos abatement; instead, they permitted recovery by misapplying the
economic loss rule to a defective component (the asbestos-containing
98. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 21 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST.
1998)  (emphasis added).
99. For both first-party property insurance and third-party commercial general liability insur-
ance, standard-form policies now contain the so-called “absolute or total pollution exclusion”
clause that bars coverage for losses caused by pollutants, the definition of which encompasses
asbestos. See, e.g., Villa Los Alamos Homeowners Ass’n v. State Farm Gen. Insur. Co., 130 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 374, 375  (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (denying a property owner’s claim for coverage under the
property’s policy for costs of asbestos abatement because asbestos is a pollutant that is excluded
from coverage under the policy).  Even if the policy does not contain such a pollution exclusion,
a policyholder still faces significant obstacles in recovering from either a property or liability
insurer. See, e.g., Land O’ Lakes, Inc. v. Emp’rs Ins. Co. of Wausau, 728 F.3d 822, 829, 831–32
(8th Cir. 2013) (holding that the owned-property exclusion in a commercial general liability in-
surance policy does not cover costs incurred by the policyholder to remediate contamination that
is confined to the insured’s property and unrelated to preventing off-site contamination); Port
Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. v. Affiliated FM Insur. Co., 311 F.3d 226, 230 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that
the costs of asbestos abatement are not within the scope of a property insurance policy covering
“physical loss or damage” unless “asbestos in a building was of such quantity and condition as to
make the structure unusable”).
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material) integrated into a final product (the building).100  Similarly, in
the medical monitoring cases, courts rely on a range of reasons for
either denying or permitting tort recovery, none of which involve the
contracting rationale.101  The case law accordingly appears to be in
disarray, with courts effectively adopting unexplained exceptions to
the economic loss rule.
C. Incorporating Endangered Consumers into the
Economic Loss Rule
According to East River Steamship, the purpose of the economic
loss rule is to ensure that contract law does not “drown in a sea of
tort,”102 thereby justifying a substantive formulation of the rule that
asks whether the tort duty is unnecessary because contracting ade-
quately protects the substantive interests that are implicated by the
tort claim.  When properly formulated in this substantive manner,
however, the economic loss rule does not bar tort recovery for all
types of pure economic loss. The contracting rationale justifies an in-
termediate rule that permits endangered consumers to recover under
certain conditions.
The rule of strict products liability is based on the premise that the
average or ordinary consumer does not have the information neces-
sary to contract fairly over limitations of the seller’s liability for physi-
cal harms, justifying a tort duty that protects the consumer’s interest
in physical security.  This same property of the contracting relation-
ship extends to certain cases of pure economic loss.  To be substan-
tively consistent with the rule of strict products liability, the economic
loss rule must permit tort recovery for a pure economic loss
foreseeably caused by a product defect if: (1) the damages remedy
would compensate the plaintiff for the reasonable costs of preventing
future physical harm and (2) this prevention would not otherwise be a
cost-effective means for the plaintiff to reduce any other pure eco-
nomic losses caused by the defect.103
100. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 21 cmt. e (“When the
product or system is deemed to be an integrated whole, courts treat . . . damage [to a component
part] as harm to the product itself.  When so characterized, the damage is excluded from the
coverage of this Restatement.  A contrary holding would require a finding of property damage in
virtually every case in which a product harms itself and would prevent contractual rules from
serving their legitimate function in governing commercial transactions.”).  Because asbestos-con-
taining materials are usually an integrated part of the building, the asbestos does not damage
“other property” by damaging the building itself, which is why the Restatement recognizes that
the asbestos-abatement cases provide an exception to the economic loss rule.
101. See supra Part IV.A.
102. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866 (1986).
103. See supra Part III.F.
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When formulated in terms of the contracting rationale, the eco-
nomic loss rule falls between the two extremes of either denying or
permitting all tort recovery for pure economic loss.  In practice, the
East River Steamship formulation is also an intermediate rule insofar
as the general bar to recovery is subject to the two largely unexplained
exceptions of asbestos abatement and medical monitoring.  The East
River Steamship formulation, however, does not identify the general
conditions under which an exception is warranted, whereas the con-
tractually based intermediate economic loss rule incorporates the rele-
vant criteria into the legal inquiry, thereby providing a complete
rationale for the full range of cases that both permit and deny tort
claims for pure economic loss.
The contractually based intermediate rule also differs from the
other types of intermediate rules—rejected by most courts—that per-
mit tort recovery for pure economic loss if the defect caused the prod-
uct to fail in a calamitous manner or could have otherwise caused
physical harm.104  Neither condition is necessarily required by the con-
tracting rationale, which permits tort recovery for only those cases in
which contracting cannot adequately protect the consumer’s interest
in avoiding physical harm.105
To illustrate, consider the $1.1 billion settlement of tort claims filed
by Toyota motor vehicle owners seeking recovery, in part. for the di-
minished product value caused by an alleged defect that could make
the vehicle undergo “sudden, unintended acceleration.”106  The al-
leged defect threatened future physical harm,107 making these claims
eligible for tort compensation under the types of intermediate rules
that permit recovery simply because the defect endangers consumers.
Rules of this type are overbroad for reasons revealed by the con-
tracting rationale.  A compensatory damages award for diminished
product value would not protect endangered consumers from being
injured in the future.  If the defect is not repaired, consumers will con-
tinue to drive the lower valued vehicle and face the risk of physical
harm threatened by the defect.  The tort damages are not formulated
104. See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text.
105. See supra Part III.F.
106. For the factual allegations and legal claims at issue in the case, see In re Toyota Motor
Corp. Unintended Acceleration Marketing, Sales Practices & Products Liability Litigation, 838 F.
Supp. 2d 967, 971 (C.D. Cal. 2012).  For a discussion of the settlement of these claims, see Mike
Ramsey, Toyota in $1.1 Billion Gas-Pedal Settlement, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 2012, at A1.
107. The alleged defect had already caused physical harm to a different set of plaintiffs suing
Toyota in a consolidated action.  See Third Amended Complaint for Damages, In re Toyota
Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg., 838 F. Supp. 2d 967 (Nos. 8:10ML02151 JVS
(FMOx) and 2:10-cv-03899-JVS-FMO), 2011 WL 5061918.
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to prevent future physical harm, so the tort claim would be barred by
the contractually based intermediate economic loss rule, unlike the
other intermediate rules that have been widely rejected by courts.108
The contractually based intermediate economic loss rule differs in
another important respect from the intermediate rules rejected by the
U.S. Supreme Court in East River Steamship.  According to the Court,
“intermediate positions, which essentially turn on the degree of risk,
are too indeterminate to enable manufacturers easily to structure their
business behavior.”109  In contrast to intermediate rules that rely on
the degree of risk, the contractually based intermediate rule is based
on the type of risk defined in terms of the substantive interests impli-
cated by the damages claim.  Rather than being indeterminate, this
substantive reformulation of the intermediate rule makes the inci-
dence of tort liability more predictable by explaining why courts per-
mit tort recovery in some exceptional cases (e.g., medical monitoring
and asbestos abatement) while denying recovery in most cases (e.g.,
those seeking damages for lost profits and diminished product value).
For this reason, the contractually based intermediate rule would
also improve judicial decision making.  Consider Sapp v. Ford Motor
Co.,110 in which the South Carolina Supreme Court adopted the East
River Steamship formulation of the economic loss rule.111  In doing so,
however, the court decided not to overrule a prior case that permitted
tort recovery for the pure economic loss of repairing a defective con-
dition in a residential home, reasoning that this “narrow exception to
the economic loss rule” is justified by the “unequal bargaining power
between the parties.”112  A concurring opinion complained that by
recognizing this exception to the economic loss rule, the court had
employed “varying analytical frameworks” that resulted in the “incon-
sistent treatment of the doctrine,” leaving “the bench and bar [with-
108. This reasoning does not imply that the settlement for lost value was unwarranted.  The
settlement included $500 million for the value lost by owners who sold or traded their cars and to
owners whose brake systems could not be repaired. See Ramsey, supra note 106, at A6.  Most of R
the claims, however, were also formulated in terms of fraud or deceptive practices. See, e.g.,
Amended Economic Loss Master Consolidated Complaint, In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unin-
tended Acceleration Mktg., at 347–58 (Nos. 8:10ML2151 JVS (FMOx)), 2010 WL 4257075 (al-
leging claims under Illinois law based on deceptive trade practices, breach of warranties,
negligence, strict products liability, unjust enrichment, and fraud).  Settlement for diminished
product value may have been based on these allegations rather than the tort claims for pure
economic loss based on diminished product value.
109. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 870 (1986).
110. 687 S.E.2d 47 (S.C. 2009).
111. Id. at 49.
112. Id.
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out] guidance in the proper application of the doctrine.”113  Why
employ the contracting rationale to reject tort claims for pure eco-
nomic loss in product and service cases except for those involving resi-
dential homes?  Is the bargaining relationship between consumers and
product manufacturers somehow more equal than the bargaining rela-
tionship between homeowners and builders?  If not, what explains
why the former is subject to the economic loss rule whereas the latter
merits an exception?  Such an exception, as the concurrence rightly
observed, is bound to create confusion. If the majority had instead
adopted the contractually based intermediate rule, it could have ex-
plained why the contracting rationale barred recovery in the case at
hand and permitted tort recovery in the prior case involving a residen-
tial home.
Sapp involved an alleged design defect in the cruise-control switch
of a truck that caused each of the two plaintiffs’ vehicles to catch fire
but only damaged the trucks themselves.114  The plaintiffs each sought
tort recovery for the damage caused by the respective fires, which the
court could have barred if it had adopted the contractually based in-
termediate rule.  Presumably, the reasonable prevention of future
physical harm would involve a repair or removal of the cruise-control
switch.  The plaintiffs, however, sought tort recovery for the full ex-
tent of fire damage to their trucks, so the damages claim could not be
justified by the contracting rationale as a means for protecting endan-
gered consumers from future physical harm.  Moreover, the loss in
question could be fully indemnified by automobile insurance, further
undermining any contractual rationale for the tort duty.115  For losses
of this type, the average or ordinary consumer can adequately protect
her interests by contracting and related measures, justifying a bar to
tort recovery under the contractually based intermediate economic
loss rule.
Different reasoning applies to the prior case involving a residential
home, which Sapp did not overrule.  In that case, the court held:
A builder may be liable to a home buyer in tort despite the fact
that the buyer suffered only “economic losses” where: (1) the
builder has violated an applicable building code; (2) the builder has
deviated from industry standards; or (3) the builder has constructed
housing that he knows or should know will pose serious risks of
physical harm.116
113. Id. at 52 (Beatty, J., concurring).
114. Id. at 48.
115. Id. (observing that one of the appellants received $7,000 of insurance coverage for repair
costs of a vehicle that he had purchased for $5,000).
116. Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & Mfg. Co., 384 S.E.2d 730, 738 (S.C. 1989).
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Insofar as tort recovery in such a case would compensate endangered
consumers for the reasonable costs of preventing future physical
harms, it is not barred by the contractually based intermediate eco-
nomic loss rule.  The average or ordinary consumer, moreover, cannot
purchase property insurance to cover these losses,117 eliminating any
other substantive reason for barring such a tort claim with a con-
tracting rationale.
Thus, these two cases can be decided under a consistent analytical
framework—an intermediate economic loss rule properly formulated
in terms of the contracting rationale.  Had Sapp adopted this rule, it
would have “provide[d] the bench and bar guidance in the proper ap-
plication of the doctrine” as desired by concurring opinion.118
The contractually based intermediate rule would also prevent courts
from denying tort claims when doing so cannot be justified by the con-
tracting rationale.  In numerous cases, courts have invoked the eco-
nomic loss rule to deny endangered consumers from recovering the
reasonable financial costs of preventing future physical harms.119
There may be good reasons for denying these tort claims (such as con-
cerns about administrability and fraud), but the simplistic invocation
of the economic loss rule is not among them.  By focusing the inquiry
on the appropriate substantive concerns, the contractually based inter-
mediate rule will help ensure that courts rely on the proper reasons
when resolving these tort claims.
V. CONCLUSION
For the 21st Annual Clifford Symposium addressing “The Supreme
Court, Business and Civil Justice,”120 the economic loss rule might
seem to be of narrow interest.  In East River Steamship, the Court
developed a contracting rationale for the economic loss rule that had
already been invoked by state courts to maintain the proper boundary
117. The standard-form homeowner’s policy, for example, excludes coverage for damage
caused by “defective . . . [m]aterials used in repair, construction, renovation or remodeling.”
HOMEOWNERS 3 – SPECIAL FORM HO 00 03 05 11, at 13 (2010), reprinted in KENNETH S. ABRA-
HAM & DANIEL SCHWARCZ, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 186,
198 (6th ed. 2015).
118. See Sapp v. Ford Motor Co., 687 S.E.2d 47, 52 (S.C. 2009).
119. See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Farsian, 682 So. 2d 405, 407–08 (Ala. 1996) (rejecting a tort claim
for recovering the costs of surgically removing a defective heart valve that had not yet malfunc-
tioned but might do so in the future simply because plaintiff’s “concern that his heart valve,
which is presently functioning normally, could later malfunction is not an injury recognized by
Alabama [tort] law” and citing to three other cases in which “courts have refused to recognize a
cause of action in similar” circumstances).
120. Symposium, The Supreme Court, Business, and Civil Justice, 64 DePaul L. Rev. 249
(2015).
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between tort and contract law,121 each of which is a form of civil jus-
tice.  The economic loss rule as formulated by East River Steamship is
neither new nor necessarily a form of civil injustice that unjustifiably
elevates business interests over consumer interests.  Nevertheless,
East River Steamship has numerous attributes that make it quite inter-
esting for purposes of this Symposium.
East River Steamship was decided in 1986, which was a time of par-
ticular importance for tort law in the United States.
From 1984 to 1986 premiums for general liability insurance nearly
tripled.  Such insurance became unaffordable or unavailable for
some, leading to the so-called “liability crisis” that appeared in myr-
iad forms such as the closing of day-care centers and municipal
swimming pools for reasons related to concerns about uninsured ex-
posure to tort liability.  The perception was that the courts had cre-
ated the crisis by extending the tort laws too far, thereby producing
an excessively costly tort system.
Not surprisingly, calls for tort reform quickly followed.  “Of the
forty-six states holding legislative sessions [in 1986], forty-one en-
acted laws intended to slow the increase in insurance rates and
costs.”  During this period there were also a number of federal legis-
lative proposals aimed at products liability reform, and studies on
tort and products liability reform were instituted by the United
States Department of Justice, the American Law Institute, the
American Bar Association, and others.122
As I have argued elsewhere, the 1980s spawned a variety of tort-
reform measures that largely share two characteristics.  First, many of
the reforms are “neocontractual” in the sense that they “would reduce
or allow for contractual reductions in manufacturers’ tort liabil-
ity. . . .”123  In addition, “each reform shares the trait of significantly
reducing systemic legal ambiguity, which in turn makes it easier for
liability insurers to forecast their expected liabilities under a pol-
icy.”124  Tort reform measures with either of these characteristics re-
duce the cost of insuring against tort liabilities, thereby responding to
the concern about the spike in these premiums that occurred during
the 1980s.
When placed in this historical context, East River Steamship fully
exemplifies the 1980s tort-reform movement.  The contracting ratio-
121. See Part II, for a discussion of the contracting rationale.
122. Mark Geistfeld, The Political Economy of Neocontractual Proposals for Products Liabil-
ity Reform, 72 TEX. L. REV. 803, 804–05 (1994) (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted)
(quoting Glenn Blackmon & Richard Zeckhauser, State Tort Reform Legislation: Assessing Our
Control of Risks, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 272–73 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991).
123. Id. at 808.
124. Mark A. Geistfeld, Legal Ambiguity, Liability Insurance, and Tort Reform, 60 DEPAUL
L. REV. 539, 569 (2011).
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nale for the economic loss rule is a clear example of a neocontractual
legal rule: the scope of the tort duty is expressly limited to facilitate
contracting.  According to East River Steamship, one of the primary
justifications for this limitation of tort liability is to make it easier for
product sellers (and by implication, their liability insurers) to predict
their expected liabilities: “A warranty action . . . has a built-in limita-
tion on liability [the contract itself], whereas a tort action could sub-
ject the manufacturer to damages of an indefinite amount.”125  As
formulated by East River Steamship, the economic loss rule embodies
the two properties characteristic of the proposals championed by tort-
reform movement of the 1980s.
To be sure, the Court in East River Steamship did not necessarily
embrace the tort-reform movement simply because it adopted a liabil-
ity rule with these characteristics.  Other aspects of the case, however,
strongly suggest that it did.
As previously discussed, the facts of East River Steamship provide a
paradigmatic instance of the type of economic loss that ought to be
governed solely by contracting.  The damages in that case involved
nothing but lost profits and the repair costs necessary to cure the
product defects and restore the products to their proper functioning.
The defects did not significantly threaten plaintiffs with physical harm,
thereby preventing them from recovering as endangered consum-
ers.126  Consequently, neither the litigants nor the petition for certio-
rari vigorously defended the proposition that the economic loss rule
could be defensibly formulated to protect endangered consumers.127
Nevertheless, the Court expressly rejected versions of the economic
loss rule that were formulated to protect endangered consumers.128
Why did the Court reach for this ruling when it could have denied the
tort claim without resolving the largely unlitigated question of
125. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 874 (1986).
126. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Delaval Turbine, Inc., 752 F.2d 903, 909 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding that
product defects only created a risk that the products would operate at a lower capacity and did
not otherwise threaten an unreasonable risk of physical harm).
127. See Respondent’s Brief, E. River S.S. Corp., 752 F.2d 903 (No. 84-1726), 1985 WL
669142, at *i (defining the certified question as whether “petitioners, charterers of oil tankers,
[could] maintain an action in tort under federal maritime law against the seller of main propul-
sion units for the tankers, arising from an alleged product defect, where the damage sustained
was confined to the units themselves and consisted solely of internal deterioration and break-
down, and there was no unreasonable risk of harm to persons or other property”).  Respondent
extensively argued that the defects did not pose an unreasonable risk of harm. See id. at *11–13
(providing a summary of argument).  Petitioners, by contrast, vigorously argued that “proof of
actual damage to person or property, of an unreasonable risk of such harm, should not be an
element” of the tort claim in admiralty.  Brief of Petitioners, E. River S.S., 752 F.2d 903 (No. 84-
1726), 1985 WL 669141, at *8.
128. E. River S.S., 476 U.S. at 870.
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whether tort damages for pure economic loss can be justified by the
contracting rationale in at least some cases involving endangered
consumers?
In light of this question, the reasoning in East River Steamship takes
on new meaning. Consider the Court’s oft-repeated assertion that its
formulation of the economic loss rule helps ensure that contract law
does not “drown in a sea of tort.”129  To support this claim, the Court
cited to The Death of Contract by Grant Gilmore.130  As Gilmore fa-
mously argued in this book, the development of strict products liabil-
ity fully illustrates a more general movement—an “explosion of
liability” in which “it is the fate of contract” that it might “be swal-
lowed up by tort (or for both of them to be swallowed up in a genera-
lized theory of civilized obligation).”131 By citing The Death of
Contract to justify its formulation of the economic loss rule, the East
River Steamship Court lent support to the proposition that the mod-
ern tort system is out of control and must be reined in.
East River Steamship is the proverbial canary in a coal mine. So
interpreted, the case readily fits into a larger narrative concerning the
ongoing efforts of the Court to curb tort liability and access to the civil
justice system more generally, the topic of this Symposium. Such an
extreme conception of modern tort liability also explains why East
River Steamship adopted an overly extreme limitation of tort liability.
As one judge observed after surveying the developments wrought by
East River Steamship, “the economic loss doctrine may consume much
of tort law if left unchecked.”132
In practice, however, courts do not always limit the economic loss
rule in the manner purportedly required by East River Steamship.
Courts routinely ignore or otherwise misapply the economic loss rule
to permit tort recovery for the pure economic losses involving medical
monitoring or asbestos claims.133  The defendants in these cases are
responsible for exposing plaintiffs to an unreasonable risk of physical
harm, and plaintiffs seek tort recovery for the financial costs of reduc-
ing the risk of those harms.  These claims clearly implicate the core
concern of tort law, explaining why courts are largely unconcerned
about whether such a tort cause of action would unduly encroach on
the domain of contract law.  The identical substantive concern has led
129. Id. at 866.
130. Id. (citing GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 87–94 (1974)).
131. GILMORE, supra note 130, at 94. R
132. Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 2005 WI 112, ¶57, 283 Wis. 2d 511, 539, 699 N.W.2d 167,
180–81 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting).
133. See supra Parts IV.A–B.
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courts to reject contractual allocations of product risk in favor of the
widely adopted rule of strict products liability.  As these cases show,
the substantive logic of strict products liability yields a contractually
based intermediate economic loss rule that permits tort recovery when
reasonably necessary to protect endangered consumers from the un-
reasonable risk of physical harm threatened by product defects.
When formulated in this manner, the tort rule complements, rather
than encroaches on, contract law.  The rules of strict products liability
share this same attribute by requiring the amount of product safety
that would be contractually chosen by consumers if they were ade-
quately informed about the relevant matters.134  Strict products liabil-
ity does not reject the values of contracting; it instantiates those values
by remedying an informational problem that would otherwise prevent
consumers from adequately protecting their interests through the pri-
vate ordering of contracts.  The fundamental error of East River
Steamship ultimately resides in its mistaken conception of contempo-
rary tort law.
134. See generally Mark A. Geistfeld, The Value of Consumer Choice in Products Liability, 74
BROOK. L. REV. 781 (2009) (arguing that the value of informed consumer choice explains both
the substantive demands of strict products liability and its important limitations).
